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COASE, SOCIAL COST AND STABILITY:
AN INTEGRATIVE ESSAY*
JOHN WELD' *

The economic value of normative legal judgments, especially those
promoting dynamic stability of socio-economic behavior, may be the
most curiously neglected issue emerging from debate of Coase's
proposition.' Present neglect undoubtedly springs in part from
Coase's article in which he, the conservative "free market" economist, ventured with theory in hand into what Prosser, the torts
lawyer, terms "an impenetrable jungle" 2-the law of nuisance exter3
nalities.
In addition to carrying the attack to Pigou, welfare economics, and
social cost, Coase rummaged theoretically through four English
nuisance cases4 and made two observations. First, he observed that
nineteenth century English courts relied upon various doctrines such
as "lost grant" in making judicial judgments about the liability of the
nuisance emitter. By so doing, Coase then argued, courts avoided the
real issue: an efficient allocation of emitter and receptor resources
where nuisance externalities are present. Legal doctrine, although
historically evolved through iterative judgments defining nuisance
rights and duties, was being used to mask what were to Coase
essentially economic interdependencies among the production and
consumption functions of emitters and receptors.
Secondly, Coase observed theoretically from a systems viewpoint
that full liability law (L) and no liability law (NL) were interchangeable ("neutral") because both would identically allocate emitter and
receptor resources, at least in the short run. Of course, if an emitter
were not directly responsible for pollutant damages as under NL law,
external costs and interdependencies created by his consumption or
production function also would be beyond the direct subject matter
jurisdiction of courts and legal process. Since the emitter would be
immune from legal responsibility, potential plaintiff victims could not
* I would like to express appreciation to Professor Ralph d'Arge whose work and ideas have
greatly influenced my own thinking about the economics of property rights.
. J.D., UCLA, 1971; M.A., UCLA, 1973 in urban planning.
1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). Unless otherwise noted, all
references are to Coase's theoretical analysis contained in Sections 1-5 of his paper.
2. W. Prosser, Law of Torts §86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971).
3. In this paper only the law of private nuisance is considered. Coase's now famous example
of the rancher's cattle errantly straying into a farmer's cornfield obviously constituted a physical
intrusion classified as a legal trespass.
4. Two of the cases which bore the brunt of his theoretical criticism are discussed in Section
II of this paper.
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entertain suits in nuisance (or trespass), and such quaintly archaic
doctrines as "lost grant" could be relegated to the footnotes of legal
history.
Thus if two antithetical systems of law, full liability and full
immunity, L and NL, would yield identical equilibrium allocations of
bilateral resources, two conclusions may be drawn. One is that given
the costless operational assumptions of perfect competition, 5 it makes
no difference to a detached, god-like economist which liability system
is used to govern pollution; either system is equally efficient. A
second, more radical conclusion would flow invoking the principle of
Occam's razor: a simpler system is preferable over a more complex
system of identical efficiency ceteris paribus. If it makes no difference
and if people and markets behave in reasonable correlation with
perfect competition assumptions, why make emitters liable . . . thereby premising legal jurisdiction and the accompanying entourage of
judges, lawyers, litigation, and curious doctrines? According to free
market economists, the market is the model if only government,
courts, and other third parties would leave emitters and receptors
alone long enough to settle pollution disputes by bargaining and
contracts.
It needs to be emphasized, nonetheless, that Coase's proposition
raises rather than resolves the singular policy issue of environmental
economics, law, and planning: who should bear the risk and liability
for environmental degradation-emitters or receptors? To understand
the policy issue in its totality, as Coase eventually concluded, 6 entails
a more comprehensive set of premises and objectives for law and
economics. The proposition's basic defect, for example, is its begging
of the policy question and circularity of argument. If it is supposed
that full (L) and no (NL) liability rules neutrally allocate short and
long term resources, the question of which is preferable cannot be
answered without considering normative policies. Normative considerations, e.g., curious legal doctrines, however, are suspect and to
be criticized as irrelevant to allocative efficiency.
Accordingly, not very much is discovered analytically by hypothesi5.

Of course, liability rules are neutral only in a world which does not exist, a world
where people are rational; where they have or can obtain without the cost of
time, effort or money all the information they need to exercise their rationality;
and where they can freely bargain without any effort or expense (other than the
consideration exchanged in the bargaining process) with those whose activities
bear on their interests. Obviously, these suppositions which underlie the
assumption of costless market transactions make that assumption "a very
unrealistic" one.
Krier, The Pollution Problem And Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview,18 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 429, 434-435 (1971).
6. Coase, supra note 1, at 44.
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zing that L and NL might identically allocate short and long term
equilibrium outputs. Clearly, L and NL would also be codes
governing socio-economic behavior and their regimes would incorporate behavioral assumptions, dynamic properties, goal orientations,
and normative choices. To say that before an externality occurs L and
NL are allocatively interchangeable is equivalent to saying two
antithetical flight plan programs could be inserted into the computerized guidance system of a spacecraft at any moment prior to
lift-off. Given sufficient time either plan could direct the spacecraft to
its ultimate destination and the vehicle would again come to rest.
Nevertheless, a basic question is inescapable: how would the dynamic stability of one flight plan differ from those of the other over
time?
Why "stability"? A pithy reply is suggested by Vickers:
As all policy makers know from experience, policy does not
consist in prescribing one goal or a series of goals; but in
regulating a system over time in such a way as to optimize the
realization of many conflicting relations without wrecking the
system in the process. 7
Regulation of systemic socio-economic behavior, then, is a two-fold
exercise in policy dynamics. One thrust is to stimulate freedom for
pluralism but also to stay within tolerable limits. The other concerns
the appropriate "fit" of governance rules to those being regulated.
Both thrusts are inseparably related, and this paper considers them to
raise policy issues as to the comparative stability, and thus appropriateness of "fit", of L and NL law in regulating socio-economic
behavior over time. For instance, no assumptions should be made
about the relative stability of a long run equilibrium state. Although it
can be assumed arguendo that L and NL would achieve identical long
run equilibrium allocations, it does not follow that they would have
the same mechanics of process. One system of law appears theoretically to be more stable, i.e., more efficient dynamically, because fewer
corrective adjustments are needed to preserve the equilibrium state.
As an analogy suppose the hypothetical spacecraft can reach its
final destination despite alternate flight plans, given sufficient time,
but with comparatively different costs for energy and resources
consumption, passenger amenities, and corrective adjustments in
flight. Making a ceteris paribus disclaimer, the more stable flight plan
is preferable because it would be more dynamically efficient and
comparatively, waste less energy, resources, and time in order "to get
back on course". Moreover its greater dynamic efficiency might
7. G. Vickers, Freedom in a Rocking Boat 116 (1972).
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better "fit" common socio-economic behavior patterns which need
relatively stable environments.
The importance of socio-economic stability would be clearly
evident if the spacecraft were a commuter shuttle. Passengers could
choose between the comparative "prices" of stable and unstable flight
plans, whether they wanted to arrive on time as scheduled, have a
comfortable flight, and be relatively certain about the safety of their
luggage. With sufficient repetition and experience, preferences would
evolve for stable flight patterns capable of integrating relevant
parties-passengers, cargo shippers, and spaceship company-into a
common set of expectations. Their mutual expectations would make
assumptions about the relationship of stability of process and normative judgments; particularly, about the value and decision-making
patterns which correct deviant behaviors presenting unnecessary
exposure to uncertainty, risk, and destructive injury. These common
expectations thus would presuppose a dual purpose for the spacecraft.
It would be a system which both organizes transport of persons and
cargo over time and integrates divergent producer and consumer
objectives for the joint benefits of avoiding the costs of dynamic
instability.
SOCIAL STABILITY AND NORMATIVE LEGAL JUDGMENTS:
THE COMMON LAW AS AN EVOLVED CONSENSUS
The basis of most contemporary environmental policies asserting
the supremacy of legal power, including authority to regulate or
prohibit economic functions, can be found in the English common law
of nuisance. Private nuisances were regulated to realize a twofold
legal purpose: to protect individual property rights in a manner
which preserved more general community and societal interests. The
English common law then was no mere dependent variable of the
forces of historical, economic, or geographical determinism.
The common law was inductive, dynamic, and relativist in its
thinking about the nuisances of intrusive emissions. It protected an
individual property user from perceptible acts creating harmful and
substantial injury to economic and incomensurate interests. It protected his initial endowments of property rights and uses from the
burden of external pollution easements.
The common law was an instrument for guiding and regulating
socio-economic behavior. Its instrumentalities were legal rights, uses,
and expectations-how they were defined, distributed, and remedied.
At its center was a bundle of fundamental societal norms: the ordinary
man and his community, equity for receptors, and responsibilities for
emitters. These normative principles were converted legally into
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functional standards. But if the legal process were summarized as a
single proposition it would, according to Salmond, reflect an ethical
maxim: Sic utere tuo ut alienmum non laedas-So use your own land
8
as not to injure another.
In this section a conceptual overview is outlined for the pre-1900
period of the English common law cited and criticized by Coase inhis
paper. Some of the cases9 used by Coase to advance his proposition
are reconsidered for their multiple objectives, normative preferences,
and functional implications for stabilizing socio-economic behavior.
The real issue throughout this section is, should the emitter of
intrusive pollutants be allowed to prevail and thereby influence, if not
control, the rights, uses, and enjoyment of neighboring property?
In Sturges v. Bridgman,10 a case criticized by Coase, the court
upheld the legal interests of plaintiff, a practicing physician, to be
free of intrusive noise and vibration emissions generated by defendant,
an industrial confectionery. Defendant's business was attached to his
house on Wigmore Street, London, while plaintiff's house was nearby
on Wimpole Street. Moreover, emitter had used his property as a
confectionery for at least 60 years while receptor had occupied his
residence for 14 years. During the latter period receptor constructed a
consulting room for examining patients which abutted a common wall
with emitter. Since the new room abutted the confectionery, receptor
not only physically altered a prior use of his property but also located
a new, sensitive use well within a pre-existing zone of noise and
vibration emissions. Receptor subsequently took emitter to court
pleading serious personal disturbance and annoyance, and substantial
interference with his professional practice. Specifically, he alleged the
intrusive emissions prevented the proper auscultation (listening) for
chest diseases and engaging "with effect in any occupation which
required thought and attention."" He sought an injunction serving a
twofold purpose: abating the noise and vibration nuisances, and
precluding eventual establishment of an adverse (prescriptive) noise
easement.
Receptor's request for a restraining injunction was affirmed on
appeal. The decision summarily concluded:
Individual cases of hardship may occur in the strict carrying out of
8. J. Salmond, Law of Torts 186 (2nd ed., 1910). Salmond's treatise is cited throughout this
section. See also, Pollock, Pollock on Torts 385-416 (1901).
9. Of the four cases discussed (Section 5: The Problem Illustrated Anew), only the two
dealing with private nuisances can be considered within the scope of this paper. The other two
involve air current rights: Bryant v. Lefever 4 C.P.D. 172 (1878-1879); Bass v. Gregory 25 Q.B.D.
481 (1890).
10. 11 ChD. 852(1879).
11. Id. at 853.
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the principle upon which we found our judgment, but the
negation of the principle would lead even more to individual
hardship, and would at the same time produce a prejudicial
effect
2
upon the development of land for residential purposes.'
Functionally, the injunction sought to preserve and encourage one
kind of "stability" over another-a relatively recent, sensitive
residential-professional use on Wimple Street from a well-established
residential-industrial use on Wigmore Street. Thus, the court was
helping guide the larger economic system as well as allocate
emitter-receptor resources and wealth.
It did so by explicitly asserting two normative principles-avoiding
the greater "individual hardship" and regulating nuisances which
impair residential development. But the functional effect also was
consistent with broader legal policies: receptor's property (use and
enjoyment) and personal interests (professional and health) were
preserved in accordance with existing neighborhood standards. Emitter was denied a possible prescriptive easement after 20 years and
thus could not legitimize adverse, intrusive noise and vibration
emissions.
Another, but minor, case was Cooke v. Forbes13 in which plaintiff
receptor, a manufacturer of cocoa nut fiber matting, complained of
sulphuric hydrogen fumes released by defendant, a manufacturer of
ammonia sulphate and carbonate. Emitter offered multiple defenses:
recent construction of a valuable plant; exercise of extraordinary
precautions; location within an industrial neighborhood; and unusual
sensitivity of receptor's industrial process. The legal issue was settled:
This is an instance of a person carrying on a manufacture which, if
his neighbour had not happened to have another manufacture of
great delicacy, probably would not have caused any injury to the
neighbour. Still, he has not a right to injure his neighbour's
manufacture at all. .... 14
As to the appropriate remedy, the court held plaintiff failed to justify
need for an injunction but preserved his rights to seek money
damages.
A. Social stability implies normative legal polices which transcend
the operation of time and history.
In Sturges the age and history of emitter's land use could not
prevail against receptor's assertion of superior property and personal
12. Id. at 865-866.
13.

L.R. 5 Eq. 166 (1866).

14. Id. at 173.
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interests. The court necessarily distinguished between the fact and the
law of a nuisance. An emission may exist and intrude upon a
neighboring property (a nuisance in fact) but be legally inactionable
because the injury appears trivial or insubstantial. Salmond, the
distinguished torts scholar of the period, pertinently stated the
underlying rationale:
Sensible men living with their fellows are content to bear with
patience many minor inconveniences, which do not substantially
interfere with the ordinary comfort of human existence; and by
law all men, whether 15sensible or not, are bound to submit to
annoyances of this kind.
An emission becomes actionable when it rises above the petty
irritants of everyday life to cause substantial injury to protectable
interests. Confectioner's emissions could predate, establish an external
zone of noise and vibration effects, and be tolerated legally until they
interfered with the doctor's rights, uses, and enjoyment. Thus
emitter's prior use, including an economic production function
generating intrusive emissions, was conditioned upon and subordinate
to interests defined and enforced by a public third party, the courts
and law. The court further distinguished a permissible use from an
impermissible nuisance: the confectionery could continue its use
provided it abated the actionable emissions.
It was no legitimating defense for an emitter to echo doctrines of
"first in time, first in right" or that receptor "came to the nuisance".
Suppose hypothetically a blacksmith were to set up a forge in the
middle of a barren moor and its noise were to penetrate the adjoining
land owned by another. "Presently, this which is useless as a barren
moor becomes available for building land by reason of the growth of a
neighbouring town...."16 Thesiger, L. J., explained the legal policy
against the claims of temporal determinism:
It would be on the one hand in a very high degree unreasonable
and undesirable that there should be a right of action for acts
which are not . . . .and possibly never will be any annoyance or
inconvenience . .. ; and it would be on the other hand in an
equally degree unjust, and, from a public point of view, inexpedient that the use and value of the adjoining land should, for all
time and under all circumstances, be restricted and diminished . . . .The smith in the case supposed might protect himself
by taking a sufficient curtilage [a yard or courtyard] to ensure
15. Salmond, supra note 8, at 189.
16. 11 Ch.D., at 859.
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what he does from being at any time an annoyance to his
17
neighbour ...."(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the operation of an emitter's use over time and history was not
absolute but relative to more common legal and socio-economic
interests. Those interests did not preclude urbanizing land development' 8 but denied claims of immunity for emitters in those instances
where the effects of pollution would qualify the rights, uses, and
enjoyment of land by present and future generations.
B. Social stability implies pluralisticpolicies which protect individual
and neighborhood property interestsfrom avoidable disturbances.
The court in Sturges regulated an inappropriate use so as to protect
individual property interests and preserve neighborhood norms and
expectations. But the process of its decision making implied translating normative legal and neighborhood considerations into three kinds
of functional standards: ambient, performance, and equity. The initial
societal premise was the "average" Englishman. The ordinary comforts experienced by this average man in the use and enjoyment of his
property relative to his neighborhood at that time established the
local ambient standard for environmental amenities. From the
ambient standard was derived a sliding performance standard for
emitters. No emitter was expected or required to exceed the level of
legal responsibility and performance defined by the ambient standard.
But he could deviate toward a lower level (i.e., pollute more)
provided the additional emissions caused no substantial injury to an
actionable legal interest, or impliedly, receptors were compensated.
Thus in Sturges Thesiger, L. J., states:
. . .whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to be
determined not merely by an abstract consideration of the thing
itself, but in reference to its circumstances; what would be a
nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in
Bernondsey.... 19

Ambient and performance standards were not absolute and universal
but relative and pluralistic because courts were ad hoc attempting
17. Id. at 865.
18. Consider Boulding:
It is not enough to have a good legal concept of property; the bundles of rights
that constitute property must be secure if economic progress is to take place. For
as economic progress always, or almost always, involves the accumulation of
physical capital, unless the people who accumulate caiptal are reasonably secure
in its possession and administration, it will not be accumulated.
Boulding, Principles of Economic Policy 31 (1963).
19. 11 Ch.D., at 865.
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zoning functions. Neighborhoods were classified; incompatible uses
were segregated locationally.
Geographical location could not, however, confer legal immunity.
Defendant emitters in Cooke stated that their's was "a neighborhood
notorious for the number of its noxious manufactures." 20 Despite
evidence that emitters had a modern plant, exercised "utmost
precautions," and that the spills of sulphuric hydrogen were indeed
accidents, defendants never asserted "a right to pour out anything
deleterious upon their neighbours." 21 Similarly, the common law did
not accept defenses alleging emitter was merely making a reasonable
use of his property or that his present location was the most suitable
22
place for his business.
An equity standard attempted to protect receptors from injuries
exceeding the ambient norm while not also conferring entitlements to
superior amenities.
The law of nuisance does not guarantee for any man a higher
immunity from discomfort or inconvenience than that which
prevails generally in the locality in which he lives. He who
dislikes the noise of traffic must not set up his abode in the heart of
a great city. He who loves peace and quiet must not live in23a
locality devoted to the business of making boilers or steamships.
The ambient, performance, and equity standards thus expressed
normative principles for equally protecting emitters and receptors. A
receptor could not be protected from extraordinary or supersensitive
uses from an emitter operating within the ambient norm. Conversely,
the average receptor was protected against the extraordinary emitter.
In short the three standards preceded and constituted a legal analogue
to Pareto efficient criteria for resource allocations. Emitter's land uses
were both protected and left open-ended so long as receptor suffered
no net loss in his rights and amenities.
It should be emphasized, however, that the equity standard
explicitly operated within a legal system seeking to preserve individual property rights and neighborhood amenities from extraordinary
disturbances resulting from intrusive emissions. But disturbances
could be prevented as well as remedied. Thus, to the extent that juries
might reasonably classify a nuisance as among the background
irritants of everyday life or that inappropriate land uses could be
encouraged to shift locationally to other neighborhoods, that system
also sought to avoid disturbances.
20.
21.
22.
23.

L.R. 5 Eq., at 170.
Id. at 174.
Salmond, supra note 8, at 193, 194.
Id. at 189.
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C. Social stability implies a revealed set of societal interests which
reference definition of private and social costs.
In both Sturges and Cooke arguments for economic determinism
were rejected in favor of preserving the value of more sensitive uses.
Private interests for maximizing the economic value of production
and consumption were qualified and subordinated if necessary to an
exercise of judicial power capable of preserving common legal and
neighborhood interests. Social costs of externalities, i.e., emissions
intruding upon legally relevant property and neighborhood boundaries, were conceived to be relative and locationally pluralistic. Thus,
the confectioner could not maximize the value of its production and
wealth if that meant generating legally relevant social costs. Wimpole
Street would not be permitted to develop according to its highest and
best use if that meant substantially interfering with the common,
more sensitive residential uses. Cooke indicates that full industrial
immunity was not conferred. Accordingly, an irreducible minima of
property rights and uses were guaranteed in order to preserve
functional legal, economic, and neighborhood boundaries.
The Sturges and Cooke courts clearly were balancing and shaping
numerous economic, historical, locational, private, neighborhood, and
societal variables to achieve an appropriate "fit" of legal policies and
the fundamental organization of socio-economic behavior. The instruments were legal rights and they defined the long run distribution of
private and social costs. The cost distribution and balancing process,
however, could be masked by normative judgments speaking of lost
grants, prescriptive easements, ordinary men, and individual hardship. But because the common law courts would not immunize
emitters of legally relevant externalities, they were severely criticized
by Coase. His comment on Sturges is characteristic:
It was of course the view of the judges that they were affecting the
working of the economic system-and in a desirable direction. . . . [But] it would be desirable to preserve the areas
(Wimpole Street or the moor) for residential or professional use
(by giving non-industrial users the right to stop the noise,
vibration, smoke, etc., by injunction) only if the value of the
additional residential facilities obtained was greater than the
value of the cakes or iron lost. But of this the judges seem to have
been unaware.2 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Whether confectioner's private cost for moving his machinery exceeded the collective costs of the externality to the neighborhood,
doctor, and health of his patients is necessarily speculative. As for the
24. Coase, supra note 1, at 11.
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long run, if "the problem of social cost" is basically that of
opportunity costs, then short run policies for maximizing the value of
production must be evaluated in the same manner.
SOME LIMITS OF ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY:
POWER, WEALTH, AND NON-NEUTRAL RULES
The exercise of legal and economic power may be expected to have
differential effects upon the dynamics of resource allocation, wealth
distribution, locational clustering, and socio-economic behavior.
"Power" here denotes capacity to define and shift the cost of an
activity relative to a revealed configuration of legal, neighborhood,
and societal norms. An emitter's externality not only spreads his costs
but destabilizes legal, neighborhood, and societal interests. In addition, a competitively organized firm behaving as a locational monopolist induces secondary effects which destabilize prior equilibrium
organizations of industry, investment, and consumption. Common law
policies avoided social "cost" by protecting property and neighborhood boundaries through a process revealing historic preferences,
ceteris paribus, for more rather than less stability in socio-economic
behavior.
Imagine that the diagram in Figure 1 sets the stage for a potentially
euphoric world for two individuals (or firms), E and R. E and R have
identical budget spaces-E's is located in the lower lefthand comer
Q*

q*

q2

Q

F qr

q

Figure I
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and R's is in the upper righthand. Each has reached identical
equilibrium consumption patterns for a good X because all potential
gains from trade between E and R (and others) have been exhausted;
accordingly no Pareto relevant opportunity costs exist. Moreover,
they consume X so as to avoid generating any legally relevant
externalities, i.e., creating any emissions which would exceed the
neighborhood ambient norm. Thus, their initial wealth, consumption,
and use of X are organized so as to be economically efficient, legally
inactionable, and more generally stable.
Some supporting assumptions should be expressly stated. The
diagram is not an Edgeworth box but rather a representation of their
common budget space in which R's wealth endowment is rotated to
the upper righthand corner. A common budget line B is formed and
diagonally traverses the diagram. Point a describes the individual and
common welfare maximizing equilibria by the tangency of their
respective indifference curves, UEoo and URo. Q* denotes their
respective consumption patterns for the good X. The general exchange economy-with zero transaction, information, and rationality
costs-has been simplified into two goods, X and Y, where Y as the
numeraire represents all other goods, i.e., Hicks-Marshall "money".
The X axis is defined as units of use of a good which has a
non-separable, potentially legally relevant externality. Such a good (a
joint product) might be units of use of their respective sewage disposal
systems. Each party may use his system up to Q*' capacity without
generating an externality spilling over their common legal-economic
boundary line. Each additional unit of use of X is assumed, however,
to induce an equivalent unit of disuse for the other party. Thus, a five
unit "overload" to E's system would result in a spillover of sewage
and five units of disuse to R. E and R then may be understood as
socio-economic twins whose economic, legal, and neighborhood
interests are in full Pareto equilibrium.
The relationship of power to the organization of wealth and
resources may be simply illustrated by using the diagram to reconsider some problems of locational monopoly from a common law
perspective. A locational monopolist is an individual or firm
deliberately or negligently capable of regulating the use of a good in
the possession of another party in an extra-market or extra-legal
manner. Here, the capacity of one party to induce an extra-market
event such as a nuisance externality would disturb the prior organization of consumption and use of X, the relative price of X to Y, and
individual budget constraints. For example, E could experience
increased use of X with no loss to his equilibrium utility UR0 o by one
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of three methods: changing his utility hypersurface to produce new
indifference curves; receiving more money (Y) from the marketplace;
or breaching the institutional "rules of the game" and economic
freedom premises of perfect competition. The institutional and
freedom problems are considered here with particular reference to
preserving the strict autonomy of economic units and the determination of prices by free, formal, and impersonal markets. Thus, Coase's
theoretical proposition necessarily assumes zero transaction, information, and rationality costs plus zero bilateral power costs, i.e., strict
avoidance of extra-market power exchanges.
Suppose subsequent to the initial equilibrium a prospective extramarket event is represented as point b in Figure 1. Its "cause" could
be E's conscious or negligent use of X in a manner legally relevant to
R's consumption. The prospective effect would be to expand E's
consumption of X from Q* to q2 , diminishing R's consumption by an
exact equivalent, but leaving E no worse in terms of his indifference
curve Uoo. Maintaining strict assumptions for zero information costs
before and after a perturbation, 25 point b is not Pareto efficient for E
or R and prospectively avoidable. R especially would suffer loss of
utilities for being involuntarily shifted from a higher uR 0 to a lower
uR 0 indifference curve. E potentially might augment his utilities if
able to move to a higher indifference curve u25 o.
A market solution of the type proposed by Coase would yield
theoretical indeterminacy in allocating bilateral resources. Points a
and c describe the limits of indeterminacy lying along the Pareto
contract curve p-p'. That curve can be reached by R and E
bargaining at the margin and substituting Y for X according to their
utility functions. Given the prospective fact represented by point b,
i.e., E's capacity to modify his behavior and land use, R's utility
position at UR o can be made no worse off. That fact plus a potential
Pareto gain for E and his capacity to threaten further "takings" of X
induce a solution at or near point c and a reallocation of E and R
resources from Q*' to qT. Hereafter this type of solution will be
referred to as emitter dominant. Alternatively, suppose a full laibility
law (L) were introduced at some time after the initial equilibrium and
known to both parties. Such a law would make emitters liable for
25. Coase's assumptions as to the cost of information before and after occurrence of an
externality and a somewhat similar equivalent variation analysis are set out by d'Arge and
Schulze in an unpublished paper. d'Arge and Schulze, The Coase Proposition, Wealth Effects,
and Long Run Equilibrium, (Program in Environmental Economics Working Paper No. 19, U. of"
Cal. at Riverside, 1972).
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money damages suffered by ordinary receptors but explicitly prohibit
overcompensation of nuisance victims, i.e., allowing them to profit
from the legal process. A prospective externality such as point b
either would not be allowed to occur or if it did, it would be quickly
remedied. For example, E would be foolish to undermaintain his
sewage knowing that he had to compensate E 'for all prospective
o. Whatever benefits
disutilities incurred by falling from URo to
he might receive from increasing his use of X from Qf to q2 would be
strictly offset in costs to R. Thus E would deviate from the initial
equilibrium allocation only if his net gain in utility exceeded R's
corresponding loss.
Next suppose a second case where a prospective externality
represented by point d would disturb the prior equilibrium and also
enlarge E's satisfaction. An emitter dominant solution would tend
toward point f but even if E did not bargain strategically the status
quo ante could not be restored. Moreover the original Qt equilibrium
could be preserved only if L law stipulated compensation for total
costs to R and refused to marginally "balance" the economic equities
of receptors against emitters.
The analytical approach implicit thus far controverts the usual
formulation of Coase's proposition: if free and costless bargaining
exists, resources will be identically allocated under L or NL but with
different wealth distributions. An alternative set of assumptions was
developed: wealth maximization creates differential incentives for
allocating resources and any solution will tend to be Pareto efficient
26
under any set of rules if bargaining is free and costless.
Since the analysis pertains equally well if E and R are two firms
with fixed capital constraints, the following policy propositions for
consumers and firms for the short run are drawn:
(1) L and NL are not allocatively "neutral" even for the short run.
By compensating for total receptor costs exceeding the neighborhood
standard, L law is essentially self-correcting, i.e., the initial Qt welfare
maximizing general equilibrium is maintained against potential
introduction of legally relevant externalities. Given perfect information E would discover no incentive for deviating from Q? unless his
prospective net benefits exceeded R's damages. In that case all
relevant costs would be internalized, and legal, economic, and
neighborhood boundaries maintained.
Conversely, NL law does not ensure, if at all, a Qf' solution
coincident with L, and accordingly cannot confirm Coase's proposition for both consumers and producers. Instead it appears to authorize
26. See, e.g., Buchanan, The Relevance of ParetoOptimality, 6 J. Conflict Res. 341 (1962).
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marginalist solutions, to disturb the partial and general equilibrium,
and to expand E's use of the joint good. The relative price of X falls
with an expansion of E's budget constraint (e.g., from X to X' in
Figure 1) and real income while R's budget space suffers an
equivalent contraction and relative price increase of X. Accordingly,
bilateral demand and consumption patterns are inversely related and
may be further accentuated by an elastic demand function for E
implied, for example, by a negatively sloping Pareto curve between
points a-c.
(2) Non-neutral resource allocations can be shown to result in the
short run for consumers and firms by analyzing the equivalent
variations amongst emitters and receptors. 27 What E gains in Y money
(y') or X by a change from L (point a) to NL (points e-f) solutions is
equivalent to R's corresponding loss in Y or X. What R gains in Y
money (y') and X in moving from NL to L, E loses equivalently.
TOWARD A MORE GENERAL AND
8
STABLE INTEGRATION2
A. A Proposition
As a general proposition systems of rules and exchange which
organize human behavior, regardless of whether it is economic, social,
or legal, tend to be relatively stable in the long run because of their
structural capability for controlling and correcting most disturbances.2 9 That does not preclude, however, Pareto analysis of alternative
policies such as L and NL liability rules for the comparative dynamics
of the corrective process, i.e., the relative efficiency of alternate rules
27. Mishan establishes allocative non-neutrality by a compensating variation analysis of
consumer surpluses. See, Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interperative
Essay, 9 J. Econ. Literature 1 (1971); and, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 Oxford Econ.
Papers 255 (1967).
28. The economic, legal, and social synthesis proposed in this section has been abbreviated
due to severe space limitations.
29. This statement should be expanded for readers not familiar with equilibrium analysis. A
concise overview is provided by Parsons and Smelser.
Both economic theory and the general theory of social interaction, like many
other scientific theories, make important use of the concept of equilibrium or
stable state. The first meaning of "process" has a given equilibrium state as a
point of reference. The processes are those series of events by which such a state
is maintained by interchanging inputs and outputs both over its boundaries and
between units or sub-systems which constitute the system in question. The rates
of inputs and outputs are not assumed to be constant; indeed the "dynamics" at
this level of theoretical analysis consist precisely of the effects of changes in these
rates. But on this level such changes are in general relatively small in magnitude
and short in duration. The "equilibrium" conception is that such relatively small
changes tend to be "counteracted" by the effects of their repercussions on other
parts of the system, in such a way that the original state tends to be restored.
Parsons & Smelser, Economy and Society, 247 (1969).
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for allocating resources with no net loss in social welfare. A more
precise statement regarding Coase's proposition may be made in the
language of economics: Given a perfectly competitive economy in
optimal equilibrium organization with no external diseconomies, and
provided income distribution and resource allocation are analytically
integrated, 30 a NL (market solution) rule is not unambiguously Pareto
optimum while a L (legal solution) rule is because it precludes any
further reorganization of wealth and resources-unless total net
benefits exceed total social costs. Benefits and costs then necessarily
reference to the socio-economic organization implied by the initial
equilibrium state. That state is characterized economically by a single
universal price for each unit of factor inputs, outputs, and labor, 3 1 and
is determined by free and formal markets.
The Problem of Process. Figure 2 describes two ways by which an
economic system might typically respond to introduction of an
externality. Let the horizontal line describe the initial equilibrium
price (or output) of E (or R); a legally relevant externality is
introduced at point to in time and resulting price (or output) effects
are plotted against the horizontal axis.
Next suppose a set of assumptions favorable to Coase's proposition:
that E and R are in separate industires in long run equilibrium; that

A A/

Equilibrium

to

t2

t4

Figure 2
30. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth, 45-56 (1967).
31. Id. at 47.

t6

tn

Time
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their products are substitutes; that consumer demand and prices in all
other sectors are held constant from to to tn; that any price (or
output) changes in E and R eventually stabilize; and that bilateral
monopolies are reversible. The last two assumptions are particularly
significant. It is assumed that any price (or output) fluctuations will
result in a convergence pattern by operation of the cobweb theorem,
i.e., the initial price (or output) is reestablished because the slope of
demand and supply curves for each industry preclude explosive
market reactions. 32 Also, it is assumed that E's behavior as a
locational or bilateral monopolist under NL rules is reversible without
government intervention. E's power to solicit a bribe from R under a
market solution constitutes formation of an unconventional (bilateral)
monopoly in which E is able to manipulate the "supply" of R's
33
property rights and neighborhood amenities.
Thus, if it is assumed arguendo that L and NL would yield identical
long run equilibrium prices (or outputs) for E and R, the problem of
process is inescapable. In Figure 2 the line L indicates that a legal
solution would be self-correcting and maintaining the initial equilibrium in all cases where total social costs exceed total private benefits
of an externality. The NL line describes operation of the cobweb
theorem in which price (or output) fluctuations for E (or R) are
plotted against the initial equilibrium level as market clearing occurs
over time. These fluctuations may be explained simply in the
following manner. R's payment of a bribe to E not to pollute creates
an economic rent in which R foregoes some of his equilibrium
producer surplus and transfers it to E. E thus "earns" a positive
economic profit (e.g., marginal revenue now exceeds marginal cost)
while R incurs a negative profit. Output in E's industry expands as old
and new firms (assuming free entry and exit) respond to E's profit
signal and increasingly seek to market a joint product, i.e., act as
bilateral monopolists and threaten to introduce nuisance externalities.
A new supply curve emerges for E's industry and price begins to fall
while the converse occurs in R's industry. Price (or output) movements for E and R seek a new long run equilibrium and are described
by the cobweb theorem; these movements may be moderated by
assumptions of consumer substitution of the outputs of E for R
according to their relative price ratios.
Of course, in the real world price and output fluctuations could
32. See, e.g., Schneider, Pricing and Equilibrium, 250-271 (1962); Fossati, The Theory of
General Static Equilibrium, 197-204 (1957). Similar convergence assumptions apparently are
made by Demsetz and Calabresi. Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal
Studies 13 (1972); Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A

Comment, 11 J. Law & Econ. 67 (1968). But see d'Arge and Schulze, supra note 25.
33. For one view of the problem of locational monopolies, see Demsetz, supra note 32.
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substantially destabilize and render uncertain the prior organization
of wealth, employment, income, and investment. And on a theoretical
level, if Coase's proposition is to be evaluated on its own premises,
more stability is preferable to less stability certerisparibus. A L (legal)
solution appears more dynamically efficient even under very favorable assumptions for Coase's argument. That L and NL would have
different stability properties is not surprising if intuitive societal
prohibitions against theft, coercion, and taking of property are
considered. Little boys, for example, are not allowed to blackmail
shopkeepers by threatening to break their store windows unless
appropriately bribed, in order to protect the stability of more general
individual, neighborhood, and societal interests.
The Problem of Starting Points. Problems of social and opportunity
cost analytically can become either muddled by assertions as to "the
reciprocal nature of the problem" or clarified by reference to a set of
economic, social and legal starting points. Coase's proposition can be
tested theoretically only against explicit assumptions for short and
long run perfect competition. But there is a related economic
problem in the marginal cost pricing of externalities. The difference
between legally relevant and Pareto relevant externalities is that the
former compensates for total costs while the latter marginally
internalizes, marginally regulates formation of bilateral monopolies,
and marginally reorganizes wealth and resources.
The real world advantages of marginal or total 34 cost pricing of
nuisance externalities, however, cannot exclude extra-economic considerations. The legal viewpoint regarding protection of societal
entitlements by property, liability, or inalienability rules was well
stated by Calabresi and Melamed:
We either are entitled to have silence or entitled to make noise in
a given set of circumstances. We either have the right to our own
property or body or the right to share others' property or bodies.
We may buy or sell ourselves into the opposite position, but we
must start somewhere.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
Identifying the appropriate social starting point and its relationship
with the internal logic of economic and legal policies is even more
uncertain, but that increasingly is no excuse. If environmental policies
are to preserve and stabilize certain community and societal values in
34. We do not intend here to review or enlarge the economic literature on marginal cost
pricing of externalities except to note that it is not accepted legally as the measure of money
damages. A legal solution favoring total cost compensation for nuisance damages exceeding the
neighborhood standard probably would not be well received by many economists. But see
Mishan, supra note 27, at 14-15.
35. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral,85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1100-1101 (1972).
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addition to regulating externalities, a functional reconsideration of the
English common law would be in order. Some of Mishan's more
general observations are especially pertinent.
A strong sense of community is not a synthetic product to be
created ab initio by skilful plugging at common interests. The
sense of community requires the fact of community, an environment of direct human interdependence. . . . In the older forms of
social organization which began to disappear in the early
nineteenth century it was just this inescapable fact of close
interdependence that held the family and community together. . . . Narrow though their lives might appear by our
megalopolitan standards they had, rich and poor, young and old,
their place in the natural order of things, a settled relationship to
one another guided by a network of custom and mutual obligation.3 6

Nonetheless, the fundamental issue of Coase's proposition resides not
in questions of allocative neutrality, zero information and transaction
costs, or marginal versus total cost pricing, but in the problem of what
is a "cost." That in turn implies the exercise of power to define the
incidence and distribution of costs and ultimately to influence the
structural organization of socio-economic behavior.

36. Mishan, supra note 30, at 165.

